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Tax expenditures are preferential tax treatments granted to specific individuals or categories of 
households which aim at achieving social and economic goals – poverty and inequality reduction, 
and employment promotion, among others. Tax expenditures are widely used by EU Member States. 
However, their fiscal and equity impacts are not always clear and their effectiveness and efficiency 
as a policy instrument needs to be carefully evaluated, especially in the present context of 
constrained public finances. Tax expenditures might in some cases distort economic incentives be it 
towards consumption or investment, in some case by favouring rent seeking behaviour and making 
tax systems less transparent and/or regressive from a social viewpoint. 
While policy recommendations often call for streamlining tax expenditures, in practice policy 
measures are often difficult to design in particular given the difficulty in measuring the fiscal and 
equity impact of tax expenditures. This paper quantifies the fiscal and equity effects of tax 
expenditures in 27 European countries making use of EUROMOD, the EU-wide microsimulation 
model. We focus on four specific categories of preferential tax treatments affecting personal income 
taxation related to housing, pension, education and health expenditures. One key feature of the 
microsimulation model EUROMOD is that it embeds the interaction between different tax 
instruments and benefits entitlement which, in EU tax systems, proves essentially to fully gauge the 
fiscal and equity impact of tax expenditures. In order to quantify the impact of tax expenditure on 
governments' tax revenues and on households' disposable income a benchmark tax system scenario 
is created where tax expenditures – in the form of allowances, deductions, exemptions, reliefs and 
credits – are explicitly considered.  
We find a variety of effects, in terms of sign and magnitude, across Member States, and within 
these, among types of households and across generations. Overall our findings suggest that the 
impact of tax expenditure on tax revenues and on income inequalities can be sizeable. The 
redistributive impact of removing tax expenditures can go both directions, either on the progressive 
or regressive side, depending on the country and the tax expenditure considered. This result points 







Tax expenditures are preferential tax treatments granted to specific individuals or categories of 
households which aim at achieving social and economic goals – poverty fighting, inequality 
reduction, and employment promotion, among others.  Tax expenditures are widely used by EU 
Member States. However, their fiscal and equity impact is not always clear and their effectiveness 
and efficiency as a policy instrument needs to be carefully evaluated, especially in the present 
context of constrained public finances. In fact, as any preferential scheme, tax expenditures 
introduce distortions in the tax system, making it prone to rent seeking behaviour and less 
transparent tax systems and can sometimes prove regressive from a social viewpoint. Since 2014, 
and in the context of the Budgetary Framework Directive, Member States are required to publish 
information on the effects of tax expenditures on government tax revenues. The identification of tax 
expenditures remains a highly controversial and arguably difficult topic, however, (see OECD, 2010, 
and European Commission, 2014).  
Tax expenditures are defined as a "transfer of public resources that is achieved by reducing tax 
obligations with respect to a benchmark tax, rather than by a direct expenditure", see OECD (2003). 
Examples include exemptions and allowances of part of the income to derive the tax base, credits 
which are deducted from the tax liability, tax rate reduction for certain types of tax payers (e.g. low-
income households, pensioners, etc.) or activity (e.g. cultural goods) or tax deferrals (e.g. as those 
affecting corporate taxes). From a public finance perspective, tax expenditures entail a cost in terms 
of foregone revenues compared to the benchmark tax system, which might be more difficult to 
justify in times when substantial consolidation efforts are required, (see Kalyva et al., 2015). In such 
a context, cost-benefit analysis of tax expenditures is particularly warranted.  
A precise quantification of such loss and the analysis of its distributional effects are not 
straightforward, in particular in a cross-country perspective. In this paper we make use of 
EUROMOD, the EU-wide microsimulation model (see Sutherland and Figari, 2013), in order to 
quantify the fiscal and equity impact of tax expenditures concerning four categories namely, 
pension, housing, health and education related tax expenditures. The use of microsimulation models 
allows one to evaluate how specific tax expenditures interact with the broader provisions in the tax-
benefit system for a representative sample of individuals. For instance, in some countries the 
working tax credits are tied to family benefits (e.g. as in the UK). Some tax exemptions and benefits 
are also means-tested, implying that changes in gross taxable income need to be taken into account 
when evaluating the overall size of tax relief. All in all, as the different provisions of the tax-benefit 
system contribute to determining the overall liability/entitlement of the taxpayers, and, thus, the 
effect of (repealing) tax benefits, the use of microsimulation models has undoubtedly the potential 
to greatly improve our knowledge of the size and effects of tax expenditures. In a recent paper, 
Avram et al. (2012) use the EUROMOD microsimulation tool to quantify the size of tax expenditures 
in the personal income tax systems in selected EU countries, alongside their redistributive 
implications. A distinctive feature of the analysis is that the authors explicitly differentiate among 
types of tax benefit, based not only on their purpose, but also on the design of the relief. In 
particular, whether a tax relief is granted through a reduction of the relevant tax base (that is, 
through an allowance) or through a reduction of the gross tax liability (tax credit) has non negligible 




This paper provides the first comprehensive and comparable cross-country quantitative analysis of 
the fiscal and equity effects of tax expenditures focussing on four specific categories of preferential 
tax treatments affecting personal income taxation related to housing, pension, education and health 
expenditures. These specific tax expenditures have a potential impact on labour decision (pension 
related tax expenditures), housing acquisition and the market of merit goods (health and education 
related tax expenditures) but they can be also relevant from a redistribution viewpoint which is 
often disregarded in the existing literature despite its importance related to the size and the design 
of the tax expenditures. First, pensions play a key role in inter-generational redistribution as well as 
between income groups. In some countries pensions have also acted as a key instrument to smooth 
households´ income fluctuations. The differing evolutions of pension and wages and influence of tax 
policy changes have also had important redistributive impact during the recent crisis (see Figari et 
al., 2015). Second, housing tax expenditures are often biased towards ownership, in particular 
through mortgage tax deduction, with equity implications depending on the tax-benefit system and 
its interaction with the housing market. Third, health and education expenditures are traditionally 
linked to expenditures made by the tax payer on her behalf or on behalf of her relatives and their 
equity impact depends on the consumption patterns and liquidity constraints of the tax payer. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the rationale 
of social related tax expenditures affecting personal income taxation followed by an overview of the 
existing identification and reporting practises related to tax expenditures in Europe in Section 3. 
Section 4 discusses the methodological approaches used together with a short presentation of the 
microsimulation model and the data used. Section 5 provides the empirical evidence focussing on 











2 The rationale of social related tax expenditure affecting 
personal income taxation 
Tax expenditures have long been used as a tool for promoting social and economic objectives. 
Common goals include promoting the accurate measurement of income, altering the distribution of 
fiscal benefits and burdens to address differences in ability-to-pay, and promoting socially desirable 
activities. Tax expenditures can be categorized in different ways. Some countries categorize tax 
provisions by budget function1, such as health, social assistance, and housing, etc. Alternatively, a 
distinction can be made between tax expenditures that effectively substitute for social policy or 
those concerning economic spending programs. Following the general division between the 
categories of “social” and “business” tax expenditures proposed by Toder (1999, 2005), those 
related to pensions, housing, education and health represent the main components of the “social” 
(or welfare) tax expenditures category. This category includes tax expenditures that support social 
policy goals, such as promoting retirement saving, health insurance coverage, education, home 
ownership, and providing income support for low-income families. Examples of social tax 
expenditures are the mortgage interest deduction, the tuition credits for higher education, the 
exclusion of contributions for health insurance. On the contrary, business related tax expenditures 
are provisions generally aimed at promoting investment and economic growth, including accelerated 
depreciation for capital investment, the research and experiment tax credit, and preferential 
taxation of capital gains.  
In the US the so called social tax expenditures affecting personal income taxation represent the main 
part of total tax expenditures in relation to GDP. Among social tax expenditures the main 
components are those for pensions, health and housing, while tax expenditures for education are 
less important (see Toder, 1999 and 2005, and Burman et al., 2008). Social related tax expenditures 
are increasingly been used also in Europe in pursuing a wide variety of economic and social aims. 
Although their specific design can differ across countries, reflecting differences in the whole tax-
benefit systems, they tend to have some common features, as discussed in Section 3.  
Identifying the tax expenditure’s purpose or rationale is a necessary first step in determining how 
the tax expenditure’s performance should be assessed. For some tax expenditures, the intended 
purpose may be clear from the legislative history. For others the purpose may not be clear and may 
need to be inferred. Sometimes tax expenditures are motivated by clear economic or social reasons 
on the ground of efficiency or equity. Sometimes their motivation has to be found outside the 
traditional economic approach, for instance in the perspective of the political economy (see Kalyva, 
2016). The following are the main examples of broad purposes for social tax expenditures: 
- To encourage taxpayers to engage in particular activities which are socially desirable or 
which the government consider ‘meritorious’. Tax expenditures are so geared toward 
encouraging investing in education and research, saving, health coverage, or housing; 
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- To adjust for differences in individuals’ ability to pay taxes. Taxpayers who had large out-of 
pocket medical expenses or theft losses may deduct some of these non-discretionary 
expenses that produce the effect of reducing their economic capacity. 
In the experience of most countries the first rationale appears to be more frequent than the latter. A 
few tax expenditures exist to adjust for differences in individuals’ ability to pay taxes; this is the case 
of health related tax expenditures. If two taxpayers have the same income, but one has a 
catastrophic illness and costly medical bills (or large casualty and theft losses), the other taxpayer is 
judged better able to pay taxes on his income. This can justify specific tax allowances for medical 
expenses. The same argument could justify also the deduction of education related expenses. The 
rationale for the first purpose – encouraging engaging in particular activities – depends 
fundamentally on the role assigned to the public sector in the economy in each country in line with 
the traditional reasons of efficiency and equity. Tax expenditures that provide incentives may 
produce social benefits if they reduce inefficiencies that would otherwise exist. Spillovers, or 
externalities, are a case of such inefficiencies. A tax expenditure can generate efficiency benefits if it 
changes incentives in a way that reduces spillover costs or increases activities that produce spillover 
benefits. This is mainly the case of education and health. An example of spillover benefits is when 
people investing in education produce knowledge that enters the public realm and is freely available 
to others.  In this case, education provides benefits, or positive externalities, to other people who 
are unrelated to the investors. Economists widely agree that some government subsidy – also 
through the tax system - for education may be justified because the social returns from education 
exceed the private returns that investors receive. In the absence of a subsidy, the amount invested 
in education would be less efficient from society’s standpoint. Here the operative principle is that a 
public subsidy is needed when individuals, who do not capture all the benefits themselves, would 
undertake too little of the activity in the absence of a subsidy. Sometimes the reason of the public 
support for particular activities – and so the use of tax expenditures – must be found on the ground 
of the so called “merit goods, that is commodities or activities which are judged that an individual or 
society should have on the basis of some concept of need, rather than ability and willingness to 
pay. Examples include the delivery of health services to improve quality of life and reduce morbidity, 
subsidized housing and education and private pensions. The essence of merit goods has to do with 
an information failure to the consumer. This arises because consumers do not perceive quite how 
good or bad the good is for them: either they do not have the right information or lack relevant 
information. With this definition, a merit good is defined as good that is better for a person than the 
person realises. Individuals are myopic, they are short-term utility maximisers and so do not take 
into account the long term benefits of consuming a merit good and so they are under-consumed. 
This can mainly explain the public support – also through tax expenditures – that almost all countries 
provide for private pensions. More frequently tax expenditures may have simultaneously multiple 
purposes and motivations. Reasons linked to equity and the nature of merit goods explain tax 
expenditures provided for education, pensions, housing and health. But at the same time tax 
expenditures may be justified on the ground of efficiency. For instance, positive externalities related 
to education, housing and health, correction of inefficiency in insurance markets or correction of 




Social tax expenditures, like other forms of tax expenditures, seem to be in continuous expansion 
across countries even if their rationale remains unclear or is absent at all or tax reforms proposals 
would intend to eliminate main of them. The reason can be found in the perspective of political 
economy (see Kalyva, 2016). Tax expenditures are vulnerable to lobbying more than equivalent 
spending programs (see Tyson, 2014). Tax expenditures are popular because they constitute a way 
of increasing public support for social policy, while seeming to be tax cuts rather than increases in 
spending. Compared with direct spending with similar aims, they better meet the need of 
government to appear to favour spending restraint. Special interest groups may find it easier to 
argue for tax breaks than for explicit spending support. Tax expenditures often bypass the scrutiny 
accorded to spending in the regular budget and may not require annual renewal in the budgetary 
process. This lack of transparency (see Stiglitz, 2002) may explain some of the appeal they hold for 
policy maker.2 As a result, they can grow over time and avoid reform, reduction or repeal. Common 
practice around the world is that the tax law is permanent, and not subject to regular legislative 
reauthorisation or review. In contrast with appropriated spending, which must be re-enacted 
annually, or even those entitlement programmes that are subject to periodic reauthorisation, this 
puts tax expenditures in a much less vulnerable position. Furthermore, even with a strong efficiency, 
effectiveness, or equity case against a tax expenditure, repeal or reform of that provision is not 
politically realistic, in that it would be a tax increase, an option that is anathema for many politicians. 
3 Tax expenditures in the European Union and existing 
empirical evidence on their quantification 
Kalyva et al. (2014) provides an extensive review on tax expenditure in direct taxation reporting 
practices across EU countries. Importantly though, in most cases the official reporting on tax 
expenditures concerns only the fiscal cost of tax expenditures without similarly disclosure on their 
impact on households’ income. The European Commission provides general guidelines on the 
reporting of tax expenditures. Following the Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks, 
EU Member States should provide detailed reporting on the impact of tax expenditures on 
government revenues (Art. 14.2). One key principle of this Directive is the need to ensure that “the 
quality of fiscal data is transparency, which must entail the regular public availability of such data” 
which applies to the reporting of tax expenditures. However no further definition provides a 
benchmark for assessing the impact of tax expenditures or the level of detail in reporting these. A 
recent important change though concerns the recording of tax credits (which cover tax allowance, 
exemption, or deduction) in national accounting with the introduction of the ESA 2010 reporting 
standards, see OJEU (2013). Accordingly, “the whole amount of tax credits is recorded as 
government expenditure and not as a reduction of tax revenue”. This principle therefore 
acknowledges the nature of tax expenditure to allow the derivation of tax credits on a net basis, i.e. 
accounting explicitly for the impact of refundable tax credits on government expenditures. The 
whole amount of the payable tax credit should be recorded as government expenditure (“Total 
payable tax credits”, PTC) while mentioning the amount of the ‘transfer component’ (TC), which are 
payable tax credits that exceed the taxpayer's liability and that are paid out to the taxpayer. This 
change implies therefore that tax expenditures are to be recorded on a gross basis resulting in 
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increases in government expenditures and revenues at the moment the government recognises the 
obligation to pay, (see Kalyva et al., 2014).  
While recent EU legislative measures recognise the relevance of accounting and measuring the 
impact of tax expenditures, the EU Member States practices, including methods, details and 
timeliness, differ notably. As noted by Kalyva et al. (2014), 18 out of the 28 Member States regularly 
reported on tax expenditures. This reporting can be made by government or non-government 
bodies which are, in many instances, associated to government institutions. The variety of 
approaches and definition used makes a cross-country comparison based on these data extremely 
complex if not impossible, however. It is therefore impossible to assess the relative efficiency and 
impact of the tax expenditures in place in the Member States using as only source the statistics 
released at national level. Existing evidence on the fiscal and equity impact of tax expenditures is 
very scattered, reflecting the variety of definition used and the difficulty to compare existing 
estimates across countries. To date the most comprehensive cross-country comparative analysis is 
provided by the study conducted by the OECD (2010). However the OECD (2010) report itself 
acknowledges the limitation of any cross-country comparison: “Even apparently significant 
numerical differences in numbers and amounts of tax expenditures can be driven by apparently small 
differences in definition and judgment. To put the issue briefly at the outset, the point of the data 
comparisons in this volume is really not to provide answers, but rather to identify good and useful 
questions”. In addition, when relying on national statistics as source of information, one has to bear 
in mind that each and every country use a specific definition of the benchmark tax system, in 
addition to potential differences in method used to estimate tax expenditure (i.e. initial revenue 
loss, revenue foregone method or equivalent outlays.). The OECD (2010) partly adjusts the figures 
reported by the countries covered in this study. Table 1 displays the main results of the study in 
terms of impact of tax expenditures for the EU Member States covered. As expected the relative 
importance of tax expenditures in income taxation are wide, from a low 0.20% of GDP in Germany to 
a high 3.85% in the United Kingdom. Overall the OECD estimates suggest that the structure of tax 
expenditures in PIT was skewed towards housing, at least in the cases of Spain, the United Kingdom 
and Germany. 
Table 1: Tax expenditure in personal income taxation (PIT): OECD estimates 
Country 
(year) 
Total TE in PIT 
(% GDP) 
Health Education Housing Pension Others 
Germany 
(2006) 
0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.03% 0.02% 
Netherlands 
(2008) 
0.30% 0.00% 0.06% 0.04% 0.05% 0.15% 
Spain 
(2009) 
1.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.41% 0.17% 0.45% 
United Kingdom 
(2007-2008) 
3.85% 0.00% 0.00% 1.17% 2.24% 0.44% 
Note: Based on figures reported in OECD (2010). Totals based on tax expenditures affecting personal income taxation only. 
Aside from the OECD (2010) study, a number of country cases studies have been conducted 
showcasing the importance of accounting for tax expenditures in fiscal analysis, although not 
necessarily focusing on the fiscal or equity impact of tax expenditures. Recent studies have focused 
on specific countries to evaluate the fiscal impact of various types of tax expenditures, such as 




(2011) on Ireland. Other studies have focused on the specific impact of tax expenditures on the 
behaviour of tax payers. For instance, in a recent study, Barrios et al. (2015) used the EUROMOD 
microsimulation model to analyse the fiscal impact of reforms affecting in-work cash benefits for 
low-income workers in five EU countries. The authors show in particular that the direct fiscal costs of 
these measures can be partially and sometimes even fully covered when accounting for the 
behavioural reaction on the labour supply side. In another recent paper, Doerrenberg et al. (2015) 
focus on the German case to show that, in presence of tax expenditure, the elasticity of taxable 
income is not a sufficient statistic to conduct welfare analysis in presence of externalities and 
behavioural reaction to tax changes. Yet very few studies, apart from those cited above have carried 
out comparative analysis on the joint fiscal and equity impact of tax expenditure on a cross country 
basis. As mentioned earlier, the major difficulty behind this type of exercise lies in the lack of 
common definition and differences in tax structures and practices across countries. Despite the 
difficulties in measuring tax expenditures on a cross-country basis, they do affect the interpretation 
of many relevant aspects of public finances and tax policies, such as tax to GDP ratios, as well as the 
distributional impact reflecting cross-country income inequalities (see OECD, 2003). 
4 Methodology and data 
The rationale of tax expenditures is strictly linked to their definition and measurement. As 
mentioned above tax expenditures are defined as a "transfer of public resources that is achieved by 
reducing tax obligations with respect to a benchmark tax, rather than by a direct expenditure", see 
OECD (2003). So tax expenditures must be measured as exceptions to some benchmark or baseline 
income tax. The identification of tax expenditures remains a highly controversial issue, as there is no 
bright line that reveals what provisions in a tax system are part of the baseline or normative tax 
system and what provisions are special exceptions, meaning that certain tax provisions may be 
regarded as tax expenditures in some countries, but not in others. The main distinction (see OECD, 
2010) is between approaches that use a norm based on theoretical concepts of income (so called 
conceptual approach) and those that use a country’s own tax laws as a basis to define the 
benchmark (so called legal approach), isolating differential or preferential treatment judged as tax 
expenditures (e.g., targeted provisions to address specific policy objectives). The former will classify 
as tax expenditures elements which might otherwise be considered part of tax design.  
In the personal income taxation the first question that must be addressed is what the overall tax 
base is: income, consumption, or some combination. The main difference between an income and a 
consumption tax is that the latter exempts the normal return from savings. In the experience of the 
US the “normal” tax baseline is meant to represent a practical and broad-based income tax (see 
Toder, 2005), that departs from a truly comprehensive base that taxes all real income once. The 
normal tax baseline in the US excludes some income (imputed rent, accrued capital gains), and 
includes some items that are not income (inflationary gains). Some of the largest tax expenditures in 
the current US income tax are preferences for capital income, including the net exclusion of pension 
and earnings from tax-deferred retirement plans, tax preferences for capital gains, exclusion of 
interest on life insurance savings. These items would not be tax expenditures relative to a 
consumption base. In Italy, tax expenditures have been measured both against a measure of 




income tax (DIT) system, which taxes labour income at progressive rates but capital income at a low 
single rate (see MEF, 2011).  
In any case determining whether a tax code provision meets the definition of a tax expenditure 
requires judgment. Even with a traditional income tax as benchmark, reasonable judgments must be 
made about what is normal and what is an exception. In this paper, the analysis is based on a 
benchmark tax-benefit system scenario simulated with a tax-benefit microsimulation approach. The 
use of microsimulation models provide a clear advantage over other methods, such as the use of 
nationally reported statistics, for comparing tax expenditures on a cross-country basis. In particular, 
an important advantage of microsimulation models is that they do not carry any normative 
implication on the benchmark tax system while deriving macro-fiscal impact of tax reforms through 
appropriate statistical weighting of the micro-data used to reflect individual and household specific 
characteristics. A microsimulation model embeds the interaction between different tax instruments 
and benefits entitlement which is usually not considered in more aggregated approaches and can, in 
certain instance, greatly influence the final impact of tax reforms. Given the cross-country 
perspective adopted in this paper, we make use of EUROMOD the EU-wide microsimulation model, 
more and more frequently used for comparative policy analysis. The model captures the full range of 
institutional features of tax and benefit systems in the EU countries. These include detailed income 
definitions (such as taxable income or "means" relevant for computing income-tested benefits), 
precise characterisation of family and assessment units, thresholds, floors, ceilings and relevant tax 
rates as well as specific eligibility rules, claw-back rates or income disregards used in computing 
benefit entitlements. Thanks to this considerable level of detail, it is possible to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of tax burdens and benefit entitlements, and of how these vary with earnings 
and individual or family characteristics. 3 The EUROMOD model has been validated against national 
administrative statistics on tax revenues collected as well as main social benefits paid to households 
(see Sutherland and Figari, 2013, for further details on the EUROMOD model). The simulations refer 
to the national tax and benefits codes as of June 2013 and do not take into account behavioural 
effects.4 The version of EUROMOD used in this paper is based on information on personal and 
household characteristics (including market incomes) from the 2010 EU Statistics on Incomes and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) micro-data (or its more detailed national version where available) which 
follow the same statistical benchmark across countries.5 EU-SILC is a nationally representative 
annual household survey collecting detailed income information, in this wave for 2009 calendar 
year. Monetary values are updated to 2013 using relevant price indices. Generally, education- and 
health-related tax expenditures are based on the actual expenses carried out by the tax payer, 
information usually missing from SILC data. In order to circumvent this problem, these expenses 
have been imputed from the EU Household Budget Surveys (EU-HBS) taking the average expense at 
household level within 15 strata of characteristics – according to age group of the household head 
(4), family composition (6) and income quintile groups (5).  
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4
 For a recent analysis of tax expenditure with EUROMOD incorporating behavioural effects see Barrios, Fatica, Martinez 
and Mourre (2015). 
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Following the most applied practices, Swift (2006) lists four alternative budgetary approaches to 
build the benchmark scenarios. The first approach is the revenue foregone method, which provides 
an ex-post measure of the revenue lost due to the presence of tax expenditures, absent any change 
behavioural reaction from the taxpayers. Alternatively, the revenue gain approach quantifies the 
increase in revenue that could be expected if a particular tax concession was to be removed. A third 
possible approach is the revenue outlay method which consists in estimating the pre-tax expenditure 
required to achieve the same after-tax benefit if a given tax expenditure were to be replaced by a 
corresponding public expenditure programs. A fourth approach adopts explicitly a dynamic 
perspective by estimating the present value of the tax savings associated with the tax expenditure. 
In order to analyse the budgetary and distributional impacts of social tax expenditures related to 
pension, housing, education and health the revenue gain approach is adopted, showing the increase 
in revenue (and decrease in household disposable income) that could be expected if a particular tax 
concession was to be removed. 
4.1 Pension-related tax expenditures 
In Europe different systems regarding the taxation of pension contributions and pension revenues 
are in place (see first column of Table A.1 in the Appendix for an overview). The most common 
system taxes both public and private pensions and follows the so-called EET approach (Exempt 
contributions, Exempt investment income and capital gains of the pension institution and Taxed 
benefits). This approach, like the TEE, is equivalent to a consumption tax (see Kalyva et al., 2014, Box 
5.1; and Whitehouse, E., 2009) and the deductibility of the social contribution is justified in order to 
avoid double taxation.6 However, there are several exceptions and country-specific features in the 
taxation of public pensions in the EU. This is the case in particular when social insurance 
contributions for pension schemes are taxed (fully or partially) or pensions are not taxed, fully or 
partially, by means of extra allowances and credits or reduced tax rates.  
If one takes as one’s “base” a fair tax in which all forms of income are treated the same (income tax 
benchmark), then the special treatment of retirement savings along the EET approach is clearly one 
of the most significant categories of tax expenditures. The deferral of taxation produces the 
additional advantage of tax rate smoothing as pension incomes are taxed at lower rates than those 
applied to the deduction of contributions. Such a treatment provides a strong tax advantage over 
other forms of savings where capital returns are typically taxed. Sometimes countries provide 
additional incentives (for instance, through reduced taxation of pension income) that make the 
treatments preferential even if compared with the standard EET approach. These incentives are 
mainly motivated by the purpose of encourage long-term savings and investment – increasing it 
toward the socially optimal level – of smoothing income over the life-cycle and preventing old-age 
poverty. However, these tax expenditures should be reviewed carefully as far as their effectiveness 
and distributive effects. In the experience of many countries the evidence that these special 
provisions lead to higher levels of national savings is weak. Even if the interest elasticity of savings 
were positive, the question is whether the increase in private savings is large enough to offset 
reduced tax revenues, which lead to negative public savings. In the US, preferential tax treatment of 
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pensions constitutes an important source of tax expenditures, but the incidence of these and other 
tax expenditures allegedly directed at encouraging savings is regressive and increasingly so, as the 
inequality of wealth is even greater than the inequality in income.  
The empirical analysis presented in this paper adopts the revenue gain approach and it is based on 
the comparison between the baseline system – the tax system in place as of June 2013 – and a 
benchmark scenario, constructed in a comparable way across countries, that fully reflects a EET 
system.7 In the interpretation of the results it is important to bear in mind that the shift to the 
benchmark scenario might imply a redistribution between different cohorts of taxpayers, namely 
workers paying social contributions and pensioners receiving pensions, with important life cycle 
implications not considered in this cross sectional analysis.  
4.2 Housing-related tax expenditures 
Many countries provide preferential tax treatments also for home ownership, mainly based on the 
assumption that they generate positive externalities on the society, encouraging long term savings 
and investment. In the personal income taxation these special treatments may regard mortgage 
interest, income from renting, housing-related expenses and capital gains from housing 
transactions.8 In particular, most part of the EU countries allow a deduction or a tax credit for 
mortgage interest and do not tax imputed rents for home ownership (see first column of Table A.2 in 
the Appendix for an overview of rules in place in the European countries).  
The benchmark tax treatment of housing related tax expenditures in order to identify and quantify 
their relevance is still controversial. Using a standard income tax benchmark (and the related 
corollary of tax neutrality between different capital investment), returns from residential property – 
imputed rents included - should be taxed as other capital income (through progressive tax rates in a 
comprehensive income tax and or through flat rates in a dual income tax) with deduction of 
mortgage interest and housing related expenses. Moreover, in order to assure tax neutrality, the 
deduction of paid rents should be allowed. In this framework the exemption of imputed rents and 
the exemption of capital gains from housing transactions would constitute tax expenditures, while 
the non-deductibility of paid rents would represent a tax discrimination. Alternatively, following a 
consumption tax benchmark – for instance in the form of TEE (Taxation of income invested in the 
immovable property, Exemption of returns and of disinvestment) – the deductibility of mortgage 
interest – and not the exemption of imputed rents - would be regarded as tax expenditure9.  
                                           
7
 In this case, the contributions for pension regimes need to be deducted from the taxable base, and to include pensions in 
that base. Any other tax allowances or tax credits are removed from the benchmark scenario. In case of Italy where a 
general tax allowance does not exist, the abolishment of the tax credit targeted to pension incomes means that such 
incomes are fully subject to the tax schedule without any tax relief. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides an overview of tax 
expenditures related to pension incomes included in EUROMOD and the actions taken to construct the benchmark 
scenario, according to the above mentioned assumptions. 
8
 Due to data availability (e.g. of net imputed rent) and important considerations on the tax system to be considered as 
benchmark (see European Commission, 2014; Verbist, Figari and Zantomio, 2015), in this analysis we do not consider the 
fiscal treatment of the value (return or imputed rent) of owner-occupied immovable property.  
9
 The treatment of imputed rent remains controversial. Following a consumption tax benchmark, where the assumption is 
that income from capital is tax-free in the baseline, there are still items that may or may not be qualified as tax 
expenditures. For example, the US Treasury lists the exemption of imputed rent on owner-occupied homes as a tax 
expenditure item against a consumption baseline because housing services would be taxable under a comprehensive 




Housing tax expenditures raise many questions in the file of efficiency and equity and tax design. 
Sometimes it’s unclear the rationale of the preferential tax treatment. For instance in the US various 
different justifications have been offered for the mortgage interest deduction, including encouraging 
home ownership, stimulating residential construction and maintenance, and encouraging families to 
save and invest. Moreover, a tax expenditure intended to benefit a particular activity, industry, or 
class of people may wind up benefiting others not targeted by the tax expenditure by changing 
prices and incomes. For example, one rationale for the mortgage interest deduction is that it 
encourages home ownership. To the extent that the deduction is effective, it increases housing 
demand, which may raise the price of housing. Today’s homeowners purchased their houses at 
prices that reflected the existence of the mortgage interest deduction. The benefit of the tax 
expenditure is said to be capitalized in this higher price of housing, particularly in the short term. 
Depending on how much the deduction increases housing demand, some of the benefits of the tax 
expenditure will flow in the form of higher prices and incomes to other parties such as home 
builders, mortgage lenders, and real estate agents. A misallocation of resources and a bias toward 
household debt may result. One view on equity holds that taxpayers who have similar abilities to pay 
taxes should receive similar tax treatment: two taxpayers with the same income, net worth, and 
identical houses may be taxed differently if one owns his house and the other rents, because 
mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing is tax deductible, while paid rents are not allowed as 
a deduction. Moreover tax expenditures on housing could favour wealthier households. In the US 
Fischer and Huang (2013) find that people with top 20 percent income take 73 percent of the total 
tax deduction on mortgage interest. The top 1 percent alone takes 15 percent of tax deduction on 
mortgage interest. In other cases, tax expenditures may correct for a market failure by reducing the 
burden of complying with the tax system. The exclusion of capital gains on owner-occupied housing 
is an example that could be justified using this approach, as the exclusion eliminates the need for 
homeowners to maintain detailed records of all home improvements necessary to establish the 
basis for the home at time of sale.  
In our empirical analysis, the identification of the budgetary and distributional impacts of the 
housing related tax expenditures follow, in general, the same logic and methodology explained 
above for pensions: any tax allowances or tax credits are removed from the benchmark scenario, by, 
respectively, increasing the taxable income by the appropriate amounts, or simply by abolishing the 
preferential policy from the tax system. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides the actions taken to 
construct the benchmark scenario for each country selected.  
4.3 Education-related tax expenditures 
Almost all countries in the EU provide preferential tax treatment for education related expenses, 
even if their relevance seems to be lower than that of the other social related expenses and also 
compared with the US, where the public support for education is provided to students and families 
through multiple tax expenditures (Cedefop, 2009).  
                                                                                                                                   
Without knowing exactly how taxation of owner-occupied housing would be implemented under a consumption tax 
(deduction with taxation of imputed rent or prepaid with no taxation of the return), it is hard to know whether the 
exemption of imputed rent would be a tax expenditure because it exempts consumption of housing from tax or the proper 




The concept of benchmark tax system is controversial also for education related tax expenditures. In 
theory education can be viewed as an expense incurred in earning an income; as such education 
expenses may reduce the individual ability to pay taxes. If the income is taxes, with no deduction for 
the expense, then the activity will be discouraged. Hence the deduction can be supported as 
removing a distortion. On the contrary, if education expenses are allowed as a deduction on a cash 
basis, while capital expenses are generally deducted according to their depreciation, the tax 
treatment would be not neutral between human capital investment and physical capital, with the 
tax system favouring the first. In practise the argument of adjusting differences in individuals’ ability 
to pay taxes is rarely advanced. Instead, the tax expenditures are justified as promoting access, 
improving social equity, removing financial barriers and offsetting socially undesirable 
underinvestment in education.  
In our analysis we consider the tax reliefs related to expenditures carried out by the tax payer on her 
own behalf or on the behalf of her relatives which take the form of deduction from the tax base 
(with some limits and characterisations, see first column in Table A.3 in the Appendix) in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Malta or tax credit in France, Italy and Portugal. The analysis of the budgetary 
and distributional impacts of education-related tax expenditures is based on a benchmark where the 
existing tax expenditures are abolished. 
4.4 Health-related tax expenditures 
Health-related tax expenditures serve various purposes and as in the case of pensions and housing 
may be motivated by different economic and social reasons. European tax systems differ in the way 
they treat health related expenditures and health insurance costs. Even if the issue is controversial, 
generally a distinction is made between extraordinary health expenses and not. Tax expenditures – 
mainly in the form of tax deduction – are generally stronger in the first case than in the latter. In the 
first case their deduction from the personal income tax base rather than being a tax expenditure 
fulfils the need of adjusting for differences in individuals’ ability to pay taxes. For not-extraordinary 
or discretionary health expenses, some countries provide tax concessions – in the form of tax credit 
– that can be qualified as tax expenditures.  
Tax incentives are also provided sometimes for private health insurance. The main aim is to 
encourage people to cover against health risks and to address the inefficiencies of insurance 
markets.  Some of these tax provisions effectively supplemental benefits provided by government 
health programs and subsidize the cost of private health insurance, reducing the up-front cost of 
obtaining health insurance. Tax credits represent a new form of income transfer and their effect has 
little empirical evidence. In the US experience, Hinde (2016) finds positive impact of premium tax 
credits in encouraging the participation to insurance coverage.  
As for the other tax expenditures, the empirical analysis is based on the revenue gain method 
showing the potential increase in revenue and decrease in household disposable income due to 
abolishing the existing tax reliefs in the form of deductions from the tax base as in Germany, Ireland 





5 Empirical evidence 
5.1 Tax expenditure on pensions 
Figure 1 and Table 2 below provide the budgetary impact of pensions related tax expenditures 
comparing the actual tax regime in each Member State with the benchmark tax expenditure free 
scenario. For a great majority of the selected Member States, removing tax expenditures related 
with pensions represents a positive change in the tax revenues collected by the government ranging 
from an impact close to 0% in Luxembourg to 26% in Portugal. At the same time, in eight countries 
abolishing tax expenditures related with pension incomes decreases tax revenues – in the Czech 
Republic case, the fall in tax revenues reaches figures above 20%.  
Figure 1: Tax revenue effects of abolishing pension-related tax expenditures 
 
On the one hand, the positive budgetary impact observed in most of the countries depends on the 
existing exemption of pensions from income tax (Lithuania and Slovenia), lower tax rates applied on 
private pensions and the presence of specific tax reliefs related to pension incomes. On the other 
hand, the overall negative budgetary impact is due to the fact that the baseline tax regime includes 
negative tax expenditures, which are abolished when constructing the EET benchmark scenario. 
More specifically, social insurance contributions related to public pension regimes are not fully 
deducted from the taxable income in Check Republic, Hungary, Ireland (for public employees and 
self-employed) and UK (for state pension), while private pension contributions are not deductible or 








































































Table 2. Budgetary and redistributive effects of abolishing pension-related tax expenditures 
Country 
 
% change in tax 
revenue 
% change in 
disposable income 
GINI in the 
baseline 
GINI in the scenario 
without TEs 
Austria 5.65 -1.12 0.25516 0.25730 
Belgium 7.25 -1.27 0.22943 0.23487 
Bulgaria 22.18 -1.75 0.32771 0.33290 
Cyprus 9.98 -0.83 0.27399 0.26940 
Czech Republic -20.98 1.96 0.23690 0.24042 
Denmark -0.64 0.25 0.25124 0.25229 
Estonia 12.42 -2.02 0.31144 0.32005 
Greece -13.42 2.00 0.31540 0.31959 
Finland 5.04 -1.43 0.24042 0.24042 
France 3.60 -0.69 0.27666 0.27640 
Germany 4.08 -0.75 0.27012 0.27228 
Hungary -10.93 2.12 0.27334 0.27633 
Ireland -4.79 1.25 0.27676 0.28095 
Italy 7.65 -1.92 0.31661 0.32314 
Lithuania 13.00 -1.68 0.40633 0.40765 
Luxemburg 0.04 -0.01 0.24883 0.24938 
Latvia  21.50 -3.97 0.35126 0.36556 
Malta -2.42 0.26 0.28498 0.28572 
Netherlands 1.42 -0.94 0.25184 0.25620 
Poland -0.44 0.08 0.31049 0.31077 
Portugal  25.93 -4.55 0.30555 0.30614 
Romania 23.48 -4.12 0.32828 0.33509 
Spain 2.74 -0.36 0.30606 0.30696 
Sweden 14.87 -4.53 0.23584 0.23694 
Slovenia 13.37 -1.39 0.23854 0.23684 
Slovakia 13.92 -1.06 0.23894 0.23933 
United Kingdom -6.71 1.43 0.31696 0.32133 
 
As expected the correlation between changes in tax revenue and changes in disposable income is 
negative and significant (-0.92, p-value 0.00). Abolishing pension-related tax expenditures implies a 
higher level of inequality of the overall income distribution in all countries but Cyprus, France and 
Slovenia, with the GINI coefficient that increases more than one percentage point in Latvia and more 
than 0.5 percentage points in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Latvia and Romania.  
The changes in the overall inequality of the income distribution can be traced by looking at the 
distribution of the budgetary impact by decile of income groups that is clearly differentiated across 
countries but with some common patterns. In countries where abolishing pension related TEs 
implies a net increase in the tax revenue, the distribution of the change in tax revenue over decile 
groups is regressive (i.e. the poorest individuals contribute relatively more than the richest) in 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia and Romania (Figure 2, panel a), progressive in Cyprus, France, 
Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia (Figure 2, panel b) while it is flat or characterised by a an 
inverted U-shape in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain and Lithuania (Figure 2, panel c). In countries 
where abolishing pension related TEs implies a net loss in aggregate revenue this comes mostly from 
individuals in the top part of the distribution with an overall regressive impact due to the richest 




Figure 2.a: Change in tax revenue over decile groups due to abolishing pensions-related tax 
expenditures
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Figure 2.c: Change in tax revenue over decile groups due to abolishing pensions-related tax 
expenditures
 





































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Slovakia


















































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
United Kingdom




Overall the distributional pattern observed with respect to the revenue is mirrored if one focuses on 
the percentage variation in equivalised disposable income.10 In Figure 3 (panels a, b, c and d) below, 
the change in disposable income by decile groups is decomposed by three different types of 
households: working age, pensioners and multigenerational households where working age and 
pensioner individuals cohabit. Across countries, pensioners tend to face most of the burden of the 
increased revenue due to abolishing pensions-related tax expenditures, with a stronger negative 
impact on the disposable income in the bottom-middle part of the income distribution. By contrast 
working age households, in particular in middle-top part of the income distribution, are benefitting 
from abolishing pension pensions-related tax expenditures in all countries where this produce a net 
loss in terms of revenue but also in Austria, Germany, Spain and Lithuania. These results suggest that 
overall the pensions-related tax expenditures can be progressive at two levels: first among 
pensioners, by favouring lower income pensioners (mainly through a favourable tax treatment of 
pension incomes), and second among working-age individuals (through partial or no deduction of 
pension contributions) draining resources in particular from those at the top of the income 
distribution. 
Figure 3.a: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
abolishing pensions-related tax expenditures
 
                                           
10
 The measure of income is the equivalised household disposable income (DPI), which is the after tax income of a 
household, available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members, weighted according to the 
following factors: 1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and over; 0.3 to each child 
aged under 14, according to the Eurostat definition. Deciles are based on equivalised household disposable income under 
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Figure 3.b: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
abolishing pensions-related tax expenditures
 
Figure 3.c: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
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Figure 3.d: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
abolishing pensions-related tax expenditures
 
Due to the nature of the tax expenditures related to pensions which involve both working age and 
retires individuals, it is difficult to foresee an age pattern of their distributive effects which depends 
on the nature of the tax expenditures, individual incomes, tax-benefit systems and the family 
composition. Figure 4 (panels a, b, c and d) below reports the age pattern for the 27 European 
countries from which it emerges that pension-related tax expenditures imply a redistribution of 
resources across generations, overall by favouring pensioners vs working age population even within 
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Figure 4.a: Change in equivalised disposable income by age group due to abolishing pensions-
related tax expenditures
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.c: Change in equivalised disposable income by age group due to abolishing pensions-
related tax expenditures
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5.2 Tax expenditure on housing 
Housing related tax expenditures exist in 22 countries and their removal implies an overall positive 
change in tax revenues in all countries – although of lower magnitudes, when compared with the 
pensions related tax expenditures. The change in tax revenues is below 5 percentage points in most 
countries but it reaches around 7% in Luxemburg and Spain, 14% in Denmark and 17% in the 
Netherlands (see Figure 5 and Table 3 below). Generally, the tax reliefs related to the mortgage 
interest payments (in the form of either deduction from tax base or tax credit) are responsible for 
the largest part of the revenue increase although across countries are present different preferential 
tax treatments of rent received  (exempted or subject to lower tax rates) or paid (partly deductible 
from the tax base). 
Figure 5: Tax revenue effects of abolishing housing-related tax expenditures
 
Table 3. Budgetary and redistributive effects of abolishing housing-related tax expenditures 
Country 
 
% change in tax 
revenue 
% change in disposable 
income 
GINI in the 
baseline 
GINI in the scenario without 
TEs 
Belgium 4.85 -1.33 0.22943 0.22760 
Bulgaria 0.25 -0.02 0.32771 0.32767 
Cyprus 0.96 -0.08 0.27399 0.27366 
Czech Republic 0.12 -0.01 0.23690 0.23687 
Denmark 13.77 -5.35 0.25124 0.23057 
Estonia 0.74 -0.12 0.31144 0.31120 
Greece 1.67 -0.25 0.31540 0.31346 
Finland 1.75 -0.50 0.24042 0.23946 
France 2.96 -0.53 0.27666 0.27498 
Ireland 1.90 -0.49 0.27676 0.27671 
Italy 3.76 -0.94 0.31661 0.31516 









































Luxemburg 7.43 -1.34 0.24883 0.24420 
Malta 0.05 -0.01 0.28498 0.28496 
Netherlands 16.90 -4.90 0.25184 0.24553 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.31049 0.31049 
Portugal  1.49 -0.26 0.30555 0.30571 
Romania 0.05 -0.01 0.32828 0.32823 
Slovenia 0.45 -0.05 0.23854 0.23835 
Spain 7.55 -0.99 0.30606 0.30456 
Sweden 2.96 -0.90 0.23584 0.23494 
United Kingdom 0.02 -0.00 0.31696 0.31695 
 
Abolishing housing-related tax expenditures implies a lower level of inequality of the overall income 
distribution in all countries, with the GINI coefficient that decreases of about 2 percentage points in 
Denmark and about 0.5 percentage points in Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  
In all countries abolishing housing related TEs implies a net increase in the tax revenue with a clear 
progressive pattern over decile groups (i.e. the richest individuals contribute relatively more than 
the poorest), as observed from Figure 6 (panels a, b and d) below. 
Figure 6.a: Change in tax revenue over decile groups due to abolishing due to abolishing 
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Figure 6.b: Change in tax revenue over decile groups due to abolishing due to abolishing housing-
related tax expenditures
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For the analysis of housing related tax expenditures, owners and renters households are 
distinguished. A number of interesting features are worth highlighting in each case. Where the tax 
expenditures removed in the benchmark scenario are related only (or mainly) to a mortgage interest 
relief (see Table A.2 in the Appendix for a description), the most affected deciles are at the top of 
the distribution thus pointing to the regressive nature of the housing tax system that tends to favour 
owners in the middle-top of the distribution.  Nevertheless, in countries where housing related tax-
expenditures favour renters those in the bottom-middle part of the distribution tend to be favoured 
as it emerges in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Figure 7 (panels a, b and c) below illustrates these 
results. 
Figure 7.a: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 



























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.b: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
abolishing housing-related tax expenditures
 
Figure 7.c: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: different scale across countries. Decile groups based on equivalised disposable income in the baseline
28 
Overall these results suggest the potential heterogeneous impact of different instruments within the 
same tax expenditure category. 
5.3 Education-related tax expenditures 
Education-related tax expenditures exist in a minority of European countries and have been 
simulated in seven of them (See Table A.3 in the Appendix). They mainly consist in deduction of 
(certain) expenses from the tax base or tax credit from the gross tax liability. In terms of cost, they 
are close to 1 percentage point of the income tax revenue in Latvia, 0.6 in Portugal and much less in 
the other countries (see Figure 8 below). With such overall limited impact in terms of revenue (and 
hence disposable income) the changes in the inequality of income distribution, as measured by Gini 
coefficients, are almost negligible (see Table 4 below). 
Figure 8: Tax revenue effects of abolishing education-related tax expenditures
Table 4. Budgetary and redistributive effects of abolishing education-related tax expenditures 
Country % change in tax 
revenue 
% change in 
disposable income 
GINI in the baseline GINI in the scenario 
without TEs 
Estonia 0.26 -0.05 0.3114 0.3114 
France 0.26 -0.05 0.2766 0.2765 
Italy 0.11 -0.03 0.3166 0.3166 
Latvia 0.87 -0.18 0.3514 0.3513 
Lithuania 0.04 -0.01 0.4063 0.4063 
Malta 0.05 -0.00 0.2850 0.2850 
Portugal 0.64 -0.11 0.3055 0.3055 
Although the increased revenue due to abolishing the education-related tax expenditures comes 
mostly from the individuals in the top part of the distribution (see Figure 9 below), the effects in 




































below). Overall the education-related tax expenditures tend to favour middle-top income individuals 
but the differences deciles are too small to be significant. 
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Figure 10: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
abolishing education-related tax expenditures
 
5.4 Health-related tax expenditures 
Health-related tax expenditures exist in a minority of European countries and have been simulated 
in six of them (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). They mainly consist in deduction of (certain) expenses 
from the tax base or tax credit from the gross tax liability. In terms of cost, they are close to 2 
percentage points of the income tax revenue in Latvia, 1.5 ppt in Portugal, 1 ppt in Ireland and Italy 
and 0.5 ppt in Germany and Greece (see Figure 11 below). With such overall limited impact in terms 
of revenue (and hence disposable income) the changes in the inequality of income distribution, as 
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Figure 11: Tax revenue effects of abolishing health-related tax expenditures
 
Table 5. Budgetary and redistributive effects of abolishing health-related tax expenditures 
Country  % change in tax 
revenue 
% change in 
disposable income 
GINI in the baseline GINI in the scenario 
without TEs 
Germany 0.86 -0.16 0.2701 0.2699 
Greece 0.47 -0.07 0.3154 0.3153 
Ireland 1.13 -0.74 0.2735 0.2768 
Italy 1.15 -0.29 0.3166 0.3163 
Latvia 1.99 -0.39 0.3511 0.3513 
Portugal 1.51 -0.27 0.3055 0.3055 
 
The increased revenue due to abolishing the health-related tax expenditures comes mostly from the 
individuals in the top part of the distribution (Figure 12 below), with individuals in the middle-top of 
the income distribution being relatively more favoured by the health-related tax expenditure with 
the main exception of Ireland where individuals in the first half of the distribution gain relatively 







































Figure 12: Change in tax revenue over decile groups due to abolishing due to health-related tax 
expenditures
 
Figure 13: Change in disposable income decomposed by hh types and decile groups due to 
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Regardless the wide use of tax expenditures across European countries, their fiscal and equity 
impact is not always clear and their effectiveness and efficiency as a policy instrument needs to be 
carefully evaluated, especially in the present context of constrained public finances. Nevertheless, a 
precise quantification of revenue and distributional effects of tax expenditures is not 
straightforward, in particular in a cross-country perspective. This paper is the first attempt to 
provide a cross-country comparable quantification of the fiscal and equity impact of tax 
expenditures concerning four categories namely, pension, housing, education and health related tax 
expenditures. We make use of a microsimulation approach, using EUROMOD the EU-wide 
microsimulation model, in order to evaluate how specific tax expenditures interact with the broader 
provisions in the tax-benefit system for a representative sample of individuals.  
Tax expenditures related to pension, housing, education and health represent the main components 
of the “social” tax expenditures category that in some circumstances can effectively substitute for 
social policy programs and whose rationale can also be found in the meritorious characteristics of 
these goods. Indeed, tax expenditures may provide incentives to encourage particular activities and 
reduce inefficiencies that would otherwise exist. Overall the empirical analysis suggests that the 
impact of tax expenditure on tax revenues and on income inequalities can be sizeable. The 
budgetary and equity impact of the tax expenditures is clearly differentiated across types of social 
tax expenditures and countries and it is especially pronounced for pension-related tax expenditure. 
In case of pension-related tax expenditures the impact can be either negative or positive, ranging 
from -21% of the baseline tax revenue in Czech Republic to + 26% in Portugal. In case of housing-
related tax expenditures the revenue impact is above 1% in the majority of countries, reaching more 
than 10% in Denmark and the Netherlands. Education- and health-related tax expenditures are 
much less widespread and their budgetary impact is more limited but still relevant in some 
countries. The overall impact on the income distribution can hide important redistributive flows that 
can go both directions, however, i.e., either on the progressive or regressive side, depending not 
only on the country considered but also on the different household types considered for the analysis 
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Table A.1 Pension-related tax expenditures simulated in EUROMOD and their impact on tax 
revenue and disposable income 
Country 
 
Existing tax expenditures in EUROMOD (2013 tax 
systems) 
EUROMOD implementation treatment 
to construct benchmark scenario 
Austria Extra pensions deducted from taxable income and taxed 
separately 
Extra pensions not deducted and 
separate taxation abolished 
Contributions to private pensions not deducted (negative 
tax expenditure) 
Deducted from taxable base 
Tax allowance: exceptional deduction (based on pension 
income being positive) 
Pension income excluded 
Tax credit for pensioners Abolished 
Belgium Contributions to private pensions not deducted (negative 
tax expenditure)  
Deducted from taxable base 
Tax Credit for pension income Abolished 
Tax credit for replacement income Abolished (the part related to pension 
incomes) 
Bulgaria Pensions not included in taxable income Public pensions and private pensions  
included in taxable income 
Contributions deducted up to 10% of taxable income Contributions fully deducted 
Cyprus Contributions to private pensions deducted up to 1/6 of 
taxable income 
Existing limit abolished 
Non-taxable old age and survivor pensions not taxable Non-taxable old age and survivor 
pensions included in taxable income 
Czech Republic Contributions to private pensions deducted to the extent 
they exceed CZK 12,000, up to a maximum of CZK 12,000 
Existing limit abolished 
Personal exemption (tax credit) not allowed to those with 
pension income (negative tax expenditure) 
Exemption allowed to those with pension 
incomes as well 
Pensions exempted from PIT (taxed only the amount 
above 36 times the minimum wage) 
Public pensions included in taxable 
income 
Contribution not deducted (negative tax expenditure) Contribution deducted from taxable 
income 
Denmark Contribution to private pensions deducted up to 100.000 
per year 
Existing limit abolished 
Estonia Contributions to the 3rd pillar deductible with limits. Existing limits abolished 
Private pensions taxed at a lower rate (i.e. 10%) Standard rate applied 
Pension allowance Allowance abolished 
Greece Contributions to private insurance schemes not 
deductible 
Contributions made deductible 
Pensioner’s solidarity contribution and Additional 
pensioner’s solidarity contribution 
Abolished 
Finland Pensioner’s allowance Abolished 
Special tax on pensions Abolished 
Local tax: pension income allowance Abolished 
Contribution to private pensions deducted with limits Limits abolished 
France 
 
Contributions to PERP* deducted with maximum limits.  Limits abolished. 
Tax deduction for pension incomes (with minimum and 
maximum “abattement”)  
Abolished "abattement" for pensioners 
Germany Tax-exempt part of pensions (Versorgungsfreibetrag)  Abolished 
Tax allowance for elderly persons   Abolished 
Contributions to private pensions not deducted (negative 
tax expenditure) 
Deducted from taxable base 
Hungary Survivors and private pensions not taxed Included in PIT 




Contributions to private pensions not deducted Deducted from taxable income 
Ireland Deduction of pension contributions (superannuation and 
private) subject to limits 
Limits abolished 
Pension contributions for private employees and self-
employed not deducted 
Contributions deducted 
Age related tax credit Abolished 
Italy Deduction of private pension contributions (with a 
maximum of 5164.57 Euro per year) 
Maximum abolished and private 
pensions deducted as well 
Income tax credit for pension incomes Abolished  
Lower income tax on private pensions Private pensions included in taxable 
income  
Lithuania Pensions exempted from tax Included in PIT 
Contributions not deducted Contributions deducted 
Contributions to private pensions give rights to a tax 
credit (not full amount) 
Contributions made deductible 
Luxemburg Private pensions not taxed Included in PIT 
Private pension contributions deducted with limits Limits abolished 
Pensioners allowance Allowance abolished 
Latvia  Private pensions not taxed Included in PIT 
Non-taxable minimum income allowance for pensioners Allowance abolished 
Malta Private pensions not taxed Included in PIT 
Survivors and disability pensions not taxed Included in PIT 
Contributions to private pensions not deducted  Contributions deducted 
Netherlands Old age asset  allowance   Abolished 
Old age credit   Abolished 
Contributions not deducted Interactions between SICs and the whole 
tax-ben system do not allow to deduct 
SICs from tax 
Poland Private pensions not taxed Included in PIT 
Contributions to private pensions not deducted Deducted from tax base 
Portugal  Private pensions not taxed Included in PIT 
Contributions to private pensions not deducted Deducted from tax base 
Pensioner tax allowance Abolished 
Contributions related to employment income deducted 
with limits (30% of self employment income deducted) 
Limits abolished 
Romania Contributions to private pensions deducted for 
employees only and with limits.  
Limits abolished, deduction extended to 
all tax payer. xpp = 0 in the data 
Tax allowance for pensioner Allowance abolished 
Spain Contributions to private pensions not deducted (negative 
tax expenditure)   
Deducted from taxable base 
Individual taxation: Personal Tax Credit (complement for 
aged > 65 and > 75) 
Complement for aged >65 and >75 
abolished 
Individual taxation: Employment Income Tax Allowance 
Supplement for elderly workers (Reducción por 
prolongación de la actividad laboral) 
Supplement for elderly workers 
abolished 
Individual taxation: regional tax credits related to age 
(Illes Balears Canarias, Castilla-La Mancha, ). We do not 
consider tax relief related to the presence of dependent 
(elderly) parents in the hhs. 
Abolished 
Joint taxation: Personal Tax Credit (complement for aged 
> 65 and > 75) 
Complement for aged >65 and >75 
abolished 
Joint taxation: Employment Income Tax Allowance 
Supplement for elderly workers (Reducción por 
prolongación de la actividad laboral) 
Supplement for elderly workers 
abolished 
Joint taxation: regional tax credits related to age (Illes 
Balears Canarias, Castilla-La Mancha). We do not 
consider tax relief related to the presence of dependent 
(elderly) parents in the household 
Abolished 




limited to 12000 Krona per year 
Additional Basic Allowance for pensioners Abolished 
Contributions  to pensions schemes paid by an employee 
made fully credited against income tax liability 
Contributions made deductible from 
taxable income  rather than tax credit   
Slovenia Deduction of private pension contributions with limits Limits abolished 
Seniority allowance Abolished 
Pensioner Allowance (Tax Credit) Abolished 
Slovakia Public pensions not taxed Pensions included in PIT 
Old age Public pensions deducted from basic allowance 
(i.e. old age pensioners have lower allowance) 
Rebate of allowance abolished 
Contributions to private pensions not deducted (check 
from 1/1/2013) 
Contributions deducted 
United Kingdom Contributions to state pension not deducted (negative 
tax expenditure)  
Deducted from taxable base 
Age allowances Set as standard personal allowance 
Married Couples Allowance Abolished 
* Plan d'épargne retraite populaire 
Table A.2. Housing-related tax expenditures simulated in EUROMOD and their impact on tax 
revenue and disposable income 
Country  Existing tax expenditures in EUROMOD (2013 tax regimes) EUROMOD implementation treatment to 
construct benchmark scenario 
Belgium Mortgage Interest Tax relief Tax credit abolished 
Bulgaria Mortgage Interest Tax relief Not simulated (check) 
Tax deduction for income from rent Abolished 
Cyprus Tax allowance for income from rent (20%) Abolished 
Czech Republic Interest for mortgage repayment exemption Deduction abolished 
Denmark Mortgage interest payments deducted for the definition of  
investment income incomes for taxes 
Deduction abolished 
Mortgage interest deduction Not simulated (check) 
Rent not taxed Rent include in PIT 
Estonia Mortgage interest payments among deductible expenses Deduction abolished 
Greece Rent taxed at separate rates (10% and 33% for rent above 
12000 euro per year). 
Rent included in PIT and separate tax 
abolished 
Additional tax on rental (1.5%) Abolished 
Finland Allowance of 85% of interest expenses on mortgage interests 
as part of tax of investment income 
Allowance abolished 
Rent taxed as part of capital income tax Rent included in PIT 
France 
 
30% deduction on rent income for taxation purposes Reduction abolished 
40% of actual mortgage interest is deductible from the tax 
payment (introduced in May 2007; abolished in 2011 but 
grandfathered; this tax credit applied only during the first 5 
years of the mortgage, simulation assumes that if head of the 
fiscal unit is younger than 45 then he brought the house less 
than 5 years before) 
Tax credit abolished 
Ireland Rent tax credit (rent relief for private rented accommodation) Tax credit abolished 
Refundable Mortgage interest tax credit Tax credit abolished 
Italy 
 
Tax credit for main residence mortgage interest payment 
(19% of interest payments up to 4000 Euro per year) 
Tax credit abolished 
Income from renting immovable property subject to separate 
tax (lower rate than PIT, i.e. 21%) 
Separate taxation abolished. 
Income from renting immovable property 
included in taxable income 




income below certain limits  
Tax credit for refurbishment of immovable property (from 
36% to 65% of actual expenses, to be claimed back in 10 
years) 
Tax credit abolished 
Lithuania Tax credit of mortgage interest payments Tax credit abolished 
Luxemburg Allowance for mortgage interest payments Allowance abolished 
Deduction of a % of income from rent received Deduction abolished 
Rent not taxed  Rent included in taxable income (previous 
allowance?) 
Malta Allowance of rent for self-employed Allowance abolished 
Rent subject to social contributions (in addition to income 
tax) 
? 
Netherlands Mortgage interest payments deducted Deduction abolished 
Rent not taxed ? 
Poland Deduction of 7% of mortgage interest payment up to a limit Deduction (not binding) abolished  
Portugal Tax credit for (15%) mortgage interest and capital payments 
with limit 
Tax credit abolished 
Tax credit for (15%) rent Tax credit abolished 
Romania Tax allowance for rental income (rental income subject to 
some health insurance contribution) 
Allowance abolished 
Slovenia Deduction of 40% of rental income Deduction abolished 
Spain 
 
Mortgage tax credit (Deducción por inversión en vivienda 
habitual: Adquisición o rehabilitación de la vivienda habitual) 
Tax credit abolished 
Main residence rent tax credit (Deducción por alquiler de 
vivienda habitual) 
Tax credit abolished 
Regional tax credit: young taxpayers renting main residence 
tax credit (Deducción por cantidades satisfechas por el 
alquiler de la vivienda habitual) 
Tax credit abolished 
Sweden 
 
Tax credit for negative capital income due to main residence 
mortgage interest payment – investment income and 
property income) 
Tax credit abolished 
Tax on capital income (i.e. investment income and property 
income) net of interests on mortgage payments 
Deduction of mortgage interests abolished 
Income from property taxed as capital income (i.e. 
proportional tax); deduction not simulated 
Income from property included in taxable 
income 
United Kingdom  Rent on rooms in own residence untaxed if below £4250 per 
year 
Income from renting own residence 
included in taxable income 
 
Table A.3. Education-related tax expenditures simulated in EUROMOD and their impact on tax revenue and 
disposable income 
Country  Existing tax expenditures in EUROMOD (2013 tax regimes) EUROMOD implementation treatment to 
construct benchmark scenario 
Estonia Educational expenses are deductible if they are paid by the 
taxpayer on his own behalf or on the behalf of his dependants 
under 26 years. Not implemented due to lack of info in data 
Expenditures added to the potential 
deductions 
France Parents whose children receive secondary or graduate 
education are entitled to a tax credit of EUR 61 to 183 per 
child, depending on the level of the educational institution. 
Implemented in the baseline: not based on expenditure 
Tax relief set to 0 in baseline 
Italy 
 
A credit equal to 19% of certain personal expenses is granted, 
including:  expenses for secondary and university education, 
not exceeding the amount of state tuition fees. Implemented 
in the baseline: imputed from aggregate statistics 
Tax relief set to 0 in baseline 
Latvia Deduction of expenses prescribed as deductible by the 
Individual Income Tax Law. Not implemented due to lack of 




info in data allowances  
Lithuania Deduction of payments for the taxpayer’s (or children) 
professional training or higher educational studies. Not 
implemented due to lack of info in data 
Tax relief added to the other existing tax 
allowances 
Malta Deduction of school fees. Implemented but simulation equal 
to zero due to lack of info in data 
Tax relief added to the other existing tax 
allowances 
Portugal A credit equal to 10% of tax payer and his dependants’ 
education expenses with limits.  Implemented but simulation 
equal to zero due to lack of info in data 
Tax relief added to the other existing tax 
allowances 
Note: in the analysis the baseline system is considered the one with tax expenditures. 
 
Table A.4. Health-related tax expenditures simulated in EUROMOD and their impact on tax revenue and 
disposable income 
Country  Existing tax expenditures in EUROMOD (2013 tax regimes) EUROMOD implementation treatment to 
construct benchmark scenario 
Germany Deduction of extraordinary expenses. Deduction 
implemented in the baseline, assumed to be health related 
Tax relief set to 0 in baseline 
Greece Credit (up to 3000 euro) equal to 10% of the annual expenses 
of a taxpayer and his dependants paid to a hospital, which are 
not covered by Social Insurance Funds or insurance 
companies insofar as they exceed 5% of the taxable income. 
Implemented in the baseline based on expenditure included 
in the national SILC data 
Tax relief set to 0 in baseline 
Ireland Deduction: Medical insurance and expenses. Not 
implemented due to lack of info in data. 




A credit equal to 19% of certain personal expenses is granted, 
including: expenses for surgery, medical specialists and dental 
prostheses for the amount exceeding 129 euro. Implemented 
in the baseline imputed from aggregate statistics 
Tax relief set to 0 in baseline 
Latvia Deduction of expenses prescribed as deductible by the 
Individual Income Tax Law. Not implemented due to lack of 
info in data 
Tax relief added to the other existing tax 
allowances  
Portugal Credit (with limits) equal to 10% of unreimbursed health-
related expenses, Implemented but simulation equal to zero 
due to lack of info in data 
Tax relief added to the other existing tax 
allowances 
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